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Agents or Trustees?  
International Courts in their Political Context 
ABSTRACT 
Principal-Agent (P-A) theory sees the fact of delegation as defining a relationship be-
tween states (collective Principals) and international organizations (Agents) with recon-
tracting threats being the predominate way states influence IOs. Developing a category 
of Trustee-Agents, I argue that recontracting tools will be both harder to use and less 
effective at influencing the Trustee-Agents. Trustee-Agents are 1) selected because of 
their personal reputation or professional norms, 2) given independent authority to make 
decisions according to their best judgement or professional criteria, and 3) empowered 
to act on behalf of a beneficiary. Focusing on state-International Courts (IC) relations, 
the article develops an alternative explanation that highlights the need for international 
judges to balance legal fidelity with the significant international challenge of endeav-
ouring compliance. The arguments are explored through three case studies of IC deci-
sion-making that call into question the “rational expectations” claim that ICs are tailor-
ing their decisions to reflect the wishes of powerful states and avoid adverse recontract-
ing.  
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Agents or Trustees?  
International Courts in their Political Context∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Principal-Agent (P-A) theory, a dominant international relations approach to analyzing 
state-international organization (IO) relations, sees the fact of delegation as creating a 
very distinct politics. The delegating actors (in the international context states) are by 
definition the Principals, presumed to have considerable power because they write the 
delegation contract, select the Agent, and financially support the Agent’s operation. The 
Principal’s authority to change the delegation contract (cut the Agent’s budget, rewrite 
the Agent’s mandate and rules, or fire the Agent) is seen as creating potent Principal 
“control tools” to mitigate Agent “slack” (unwanted Agent behavior that the Principal 
does not like and would not have chosen for itself).  P-A theory does not expect Princi-
pal control to be complete, but the power to recontract is seen as an important source of 
Principal political leverage, and the primary axis of P-A relations is presumed to revolve 
around implicit or explicit recontracting threats combined with Agent concerns about 
inciting adverse recontracting. 
International Courts (ICs) are institutional actors whose power and authority is enti-
rely an artifact of state delegation. States write, and can rewrite, the rules ICs interpret, 
and the mandate and jurisdiction of the IC.  States choose who will serve as a judge on 
an IC, and while it is next to impossible to fire an international judge for issuing unwan-
ted decisions, states can choose not to reappoint an international judge after a relatively 
short term in office (4-6 years). How does the fact that ICs rely on a revocable delegated 
authority shape state-IC relations?  Not much at all is my answer. 
The primary objective of this paper is to urge a shift in the focus of state-IC relations 
away from the “delegation” aspect that animates P-A theory and away from the default 
assumption that the international courts constantly angle to avoid adverse recontracting. 
                                                 
∗  This paper has generated interest and comments from so many people, I am sure to forget some. I would like to 
thank Judy Goldstein, Brian Hanson, Lawrence Helfer, Ian Johnstone, Mona Lyne, Jide Nzelibe, Helen Milner, 
Jon Pevehouse, Eric Posner, Paul Stephans, and the participants in PIPEs at University of Chicago for comments 
on earlier versions of this paper. Special thanks to Robert Keohane who defended me against a highly critical on-
slaught, encouraging me to pursue the idea of courts as Trustees, to Jonas Tallberg, Darren Hawkins, Dan Nelson, 
David Lake and Mike Tierney, who while enthusiasts of P-A theory engaged my work constructively in numer-
ous reads, and to Richard Steinberg who worked with me to identify cases that would strengthen the argument. 
This paper has benefited tremendously from the sustained challenges from participants in the project on Delega-
tion to International Institutions and the later sharp critiques at the “Transformations of the State” Sonderfor-
schungsberich 597at the University of Bremen.   
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Section I examines the assumptions underpinning P-A theory and the difficulty of as-
sessing P-A claims.  It argues that P-A hypotheses about whether delegation generates 
more or less Agent autonomy lead to contradictory conjectures about ICs that are large-
ly unverifiable. To make P-A theory testable I narrow the theory to its core- the claim 
that recontracting concerns shape Agent behavior and are thus central to P-A relations. 
This core animates rational expectations claims that Agents will reflect the interests of 
the Principals even if we cannot find evidence of Principals actively seeking to influen-
ce the Agent. 
Sections II and III provide different reasons to believe that recontracting concerns 
would not be central elements of State-IC relations. Questioning the assumption that 
delegation per se creates a relationship of Agent dependence on the Principal, section II 
builds on Giandomenico Majone’s insight that delegation to enhance the credibility of 
the Principal has a different logic than delegation for transaction cost reasons (2001). 
Section II delineates factors that separate “Trustees” from “Agents” and explains why 
different politics ensue in delegation to Trustees compared to delegation to Agents.  The 
Trustee category applies to all “Agents” 1) selected because of their personal and/or 
professional reputation; 2) given independent authority to make decisions according to 
the Trustee’s best judgment and/or the Trustee’s professional criteria; and 3) empowe-
red to act on behalf of a beneficiary (where the beneficiary is different than the collecti-
ve Principal). Even if politics in delegation to Trustees differs, this does not mean that 
Principal tools of control are ineffective. Section III shows how international political 
factors including the disparity of power in the international system and state’s penchant 
for protecting national sovereign authority have led to decision-rules at the international 
level that make it very hard for states to exercise their collective Principal tools to stack 
ICs or credibly threaten IC’s with adverse recontracting. 
The critique of P-A theory is supported through the examination of three cases pi-
cked to provide variation in factors that some scholars see as generating variation in the 
independence and effectiveness of ICs (Slaughter, Keohane, and Moravcsik 2000: ; Hel-
fer and Slaughter 1997: ; Posner and Yoo 2004). In all three cases the judges “slipped” 
beyond what was intended or wanted, yet the judges were not sanctioned nor were the 
legal interpretations reversed. Two of the cases—World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Appellate Body rulings regarding “unforeseen developments,” and the European Court 
of Justice’s extension of its authority to include some oversight of how nations organize 
their military—provide evidence of unwanted IC slippage where the rulings were 
respected and the political status quo clearly shifted. The third case- the International 
Court of Justice’s condemnation of the US mining of Nicaragua’s waters—shows slip-
page where the impact of the ruling is less clear. The Nicaragua case, though controver-
sial, is used because it expands the claims beyond the “usual suspects” of powerful in-
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dependent ICs showing that despite the ICJ’s greater “dependence” and even though the 
ICJ knew its ruling would provoke a negative response, it still made a hard ruling the 
US did not want. 
While the paper does suggest an alternative understanding of the influence of states 
over ICs, the larger point of this manuscript is to provoke a more fruitful debate about 
the relationship between states and international courts.  The alternative to P-A theory is 
not that IOs have complete autonomy, or that IOs are not influenced by states or poli-
tics, or that states are completely unable to reign in a Trustee with a pattern of excee-
ding its mandate or deciding in ways the powerful dislike. The conclusion discusses the 
three larger goals of the critique, each of which is aimed at enhancing our understanding 
of how states do shape International Trustee behavior: 1) conceptually challenging the 
prevalent “rational expectations” argument that misdirects analysts to the issue of inter-
national Trustees rationally anticipating adverse recontracting; 2) provoking P-A theo-
rists to themselves circumscribe and thereby improve their theory by exploring limits to 
its useful applicability; 3) shifting the focus of analysis back to the more open question 
of what is the nature of state-International Trustee relations, which will allow us to see 
how states live with independent Trustees by avoiding the domain of the Trustee where 
it is desirable and possible, and by compensating after the fact for unwanted Trustee 
behavior.  
I. HOW CAN WE ASSESS THE UTILITY OF PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY? 
The Principal-Agent approach is primarily a framework to describe functional delegati-
on and the design choices states make when they delegate. Building on theories of coo-
peration, the P-A framework identifies both transaction cost reasons and credibility rea-
sons to delegate to Agents (e.g. to have Agents monitor compliance, fill in incomplete 
contracts, make regulatory decisions, take the blame for unpopular rulings, or enhance 
the credibility of the Principal) (Pollack 2003: Chapter 1 esp p. 20). The value added of 
the P-A approach is its focus on the Principal’s concern about Agent slack, identifying 
features of the delegation contract that help states monitor and/or sanction Agent slack. 
As a descriptive framework the P-A approach is neither testable nor falsifiable. By defi-
nition states create most IOs through delegation, and make decisions about designing 
the IO. There are always reasons for delegation decisions, and finding that the “reason” 
states delegate fits onto the P-A list of reasons, or that features of the contract allow for 
Agent monitoring or sanctioning is not support for P-A theory just like finding a diffe-
rent actual reason for delegation or for the contract features is not disconfirmation of the 
P-A framework.   
P-A analysis transforms itself into a potentially testable theory by generating predic-
tions about how the contracting relationship comes to shape Agent behavior. P-A theory 
assumes that being the author of the delegation contract confers a hierarchical Principal 
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control over the Agent. The metaphor used by Michael Tierney, Darren Hawkins, David 
Lake and Daniel Nelson is revealing: 
Delegation is a conditional grant of authority from a Principal to an Agent in which 
the latter is empowered to act on behalf of the former. This grant of authority is limited 
in time or scope and must be revocable by the Principal.  Principals and Agents are, in 
the language of constructivism, mutually constitutive.  That is, like “master” and “sla-
ve,” an actor cannot be a Principal without an Agent, and visa versa.  The actors are 
defined by their relationship to each other. (Hawkins et al. 2004: 9) 
The meta-assumptions of P-A also imply hierarchy.  P-A theory assumes that Agents 
have their own preferences but they do not want adverse recontracting and actively seek 
to avoid it, and that Principals do not like Agent slack and ceteris paribus would use 
their recontracting power to sanction slacking behavior. The Principal’s unique and exc-
lusive contracting powers—to appointment, fire, cut the budget, or rewrite the mandates 
of the Agent—are seen as conferring a privileged and hierarchical source of leverage 
over the Agent, providing the micro-mechanisms to understand how and why Principals 
control and influence the Agent. Rational expectations arguments fill where we do not 
actually see Principals using their control tools. Principals may rely on non-state actors, 
committees, or other “checks and balances” to monitor and check Agents, with the re-
contracting threat lurking in the background. Even if Principals never actually flex their 
contracting powers, Agents know that (by presumption) Principals have a preference to 
sanction slack. Agents (by presumption) wanting to avoid adverse recontracting, ratio-
nally anticipate Principal recontracting and adjust their behavior accordingly, avoiding 
behavior that can provoke adverse recontracting. 
P-A theory expects Principal control to be incomplete. Most P-A analyses have as a 
dependent variable explaining discretion/slippage, arguing that the size and extent of 
discretion/slippage is a function of 1) informational disparities that allow Agents to obs-
cure their slippage and 2) recontracting decision-rules that create costs and difficulties 
associated with recontracting. By focusing on these factors, P-A theory generates hypo-
theses that locate different Agents along a continuum of highly “controlled” Agents to 
highly “autonomous” Agents, captured on the chart below. The implication of the conti-
nuum is that autonomous agents are more likely to slip compared to more controlled 
agents. 
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Highly Controlled Agent  Highly Autonomous Agent
   
   
Highly transparent if Agent is sla-
cking (low levels of uncertainty, 
low informational advantages for 
the Agent) 
 Great uncertainty as to 
whether or not Agent is sla-
cking (high informational ad-
vantages for the Agent)
Low thresholds required to re-
contract 
 High thresholds required to 
recontract
No employment protection and/or 
short term appointments so slacking 
Agents can be easily replaced 
 High employment protection 
and long term lengths (i.e. 
lifetime employment) so P has 
little political leverage over A
 
In a highly stylized world can one operationalize these variables to map different A-
gents onto the above continuum.  But in the real world, the variables P-A theory relies 
on are highly fungible and at times even immeasurable, making points between the ide-
al-type extremes hard to define in a testable way. Also, it is not clear what to do when 
independent variables (information context, costs of recontracting, control over ap-
pointment/reappointment process) point in different directions.  
A well-worn example reveals the inherent problem. Assume an Agent is ordered to 
use 10,000 soldiers to take a hill to win the battle, with the monitoring being the Princi-
pal’s promise to look for the American flag on the hill. This is a pretty clear set of direc-
tions, yet within it are potentially contradictory elements. How is the analyst or the A-
gent supposed to know which aspect of the directions is most important to the Principal 
(10,000 soldiers or taking the hill or winning the battle) and thus what the Principal real-
ly wants? Assuming we can figure what the Principal really wanted, how can we rank 
order behaviors in terms of relative slippage? Consider the following scenarios.    
Scenario Action 
Scenario A 
Win battle with extra troops  
Agent takes the hill and plants the flag, but uses 20,000 
instead of 10,000 soldiers to win the battle. 
Scenario B 
Lose battle, 10,000 troops  
Agent sends 10,000 soldiers to take the hill but loses the  
battle. 
Scenario C 
Win battle, do not capture 
hill 
Agent ignores order to take the hill as a suicide mission, but 
it wins the battle. The hill remains an isolated pocket of  
resistance until the war ends. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 8) 
- 6 - 
Scenario Action 
Scenario D 
Prioritizes an objective not in 
the order 
Agent sees this particular battle as a sinkhole and believes its 
performance will be judged by the overall outcome of the 
war. It ignores the order and sends troops elsewhere. It wins 
the war.  
Scenario E 
Prioritizes following order 
over larger objective 
Agent takes the hill and wins the battle, but 100,000 soldiers 
are sacrificed in the effort and Agent loses the war. 
   
P-A theory seeks to explain specific choices as well as general patterns. If there were 
two, three, or five armies, and two, three or five hills, could we look at what each army 
did and say Army A choosing scenario A was greater slippage than Army B choosing 
scenario B, etc.? How then would we know if P-A factors were explaining the Army’s 
scenario choice, or something else like the battlefield conditions?  
The tendency of P-A analysts to rely on revealed or deduced preferences to deal with 
measurement problems makes things worse because it assumes away the ambiguity. It 
might seem reasonable to ascertain from the Principal’s anger that the army relied on 
20,000 soldiers and not 10,000 as ordered, that the Army had slipped. But this revealed 
preference may be wrong because maybe the Principal had really wanted the army to 
win the battle and had said as much, focusing on the 10,000 soldiers’ part only after it 
learned that it was desperately short of soldiers or that the whole battle was a mistake. 
There may also be background conditions that the Agent knows and uses to filter the 
order.  What if the Colonel making the order was likely to be fired soon, or was a close 
ally of a General that was about to be purged?  What if two Generals supported the or-
der and two opposed it, so that the Principal was divided? Revealed preferences are e-
ven more problematic when one is interpreting a non-response. To assume that no ad-
verse Principal reaction means that the Principal is satisfied (and thus there was no sla-
cking) introduces a tautology by defining Agent slacking in terms Principal action, not 
Principal preferences.  
The case of delegation to ICs is symptomatic of these problems. The difficulty of in-
ternational negotiations often itself leads to vague and/or contradictory legal rules repre-
senting compromises. Even with clear rules, unexpected scenarios arise, political lea-
ders change, and the underlying context shifts so that the Principal preferences when the 
rules were written may no longer apply. What litigant-states desire (e.g. to win their 
case) is not necessarily the same as what the Principal-states desire (to have the rules 
respected), and some members of the Principal may want one thing while others want 
something else. Also, we cannot tell how the P-A factors interrelate to know whether or 
not we should expect greater or lesser court autonomy in general or in specific cases. 
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Thus we get expectations that range across the map, and are essentially contradictory, 
depending on which aspect of IC design we examine.  
Scholars employing P-A theory to the subject of the European Court of Justice, for 
example, have argued that the ECJ is not an autonomous actor and that the ECJ is a re-
latively autonomous actor.  Geoffrey Garrett and Barry Weingast, using P-A analysis, 
pointed out “political actors have a range of avenues through which they may alter or 
limit the role of courts….the possibility of such a reaction drives a court that wishes to 
preserve its independence and legitimacy to remain in the area of acceptable latitude” 
(Garrett and Weingast 1993: 201). Their P-A analysis leads them to conclude that the 
ECJ has very little political autonomy so that its decisions mainly select among the ran-
ge of outcomes the most powerful states implicitly want. Geoffrey Garrett and George 
Tsebelis later argue that there should be variation in ECJ autonomy; when the ECJ is 
interpreting the provisions of the Treaty that require unanimous support to change, ECJ 
autonomy is high but when the ECJ is interpreting directives or regulations that can be 
changed by a lower voting threshold, ECJ autonomy is lower (Tsebelis and Garrett 
2001).  Yet elsewhere Garrett has argued (counter to most P-A presumptions) that the 
ECJ will have greater autonomy when there is greater clarity in the law (because the 
ECJ can use the clarity for political cover) and when its case law is well established 
(Garrett, Kelemen, and Schulz 1998). So is the ECJ autonomous or not? Mark Pollack 
and Jonas Tallberg use P-A theory to find that the ECJ is actually quite autonomous 
because the requirement of unanimity to overturn an ECJ decision makes reversing the 
ECJ hard to do (Tallberg 2002: ; Pollack 2003: 201).  Where Garrett and Weingast ex-
pected the ECJ to be far less autonomous than national supreme courts because it is an 
international court relying on a treaty (Garrett and Weingast 1993: 201), Pollack expects 
the ECJ to actually be more autonomous than national supreme courts because revising 
EU law may require a higher voting threshold than changing a national constitution 
(Pollack 2003: 201). Paul Stephan’s P-A analysis focuses on the short term length for 
IC judges.  
A typical arrangement involves limiting the tenure in the adjudicatory bodies to short 
terms… Knowing that they can be replaced, the members of the tribunal have an incen-
tive not to do anything that will upset the countries with nominating authority. In those 
cases where the members nonetheless veer off in an unanticipated direction, the nomi-
nating state can institute a course correction within a relatively short period of time by 
choosing "sounder" candidates for the tribunal. Thus one should not expect ambitious, 
systematic, and comprehensive law coming from an institution endowed with the autho-
rity to develop unified law on an international level. (Stephan 2002: 7-8) 
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His examples are the WTO and the ECJ.  It should be said that Stephan holds a minority 
view about the activism of the ECJ and WTO.1 The point is how can we compare Ste-
phan’s claim of low ECJ and WTO autonomy based on the term lengths of judges to 
Pollack’s claim of high ECJ autonomy based on the decision-rules to reverse ECJ deci-
sions? These alternative arguments are not logically inconsistent; they are focusing on 
different pieces of the elephant.  But with these various arguments nearly any P-A claim 
can be made and pointed to as an “explanation” of an independent or dependent ECJ. 
And with these opposing claims, understanding the elephant becomes very hard indeed.   
Because Principal preferences are highly fungible, because each claim is about an e-
lement of degree (relatively more or relatively less) and because there are P-A factors 
pointing towards both dependent and independent ICs, adjudicating the validity of diffe-
rent claims is hard even when there is no disagreement about the facts. This problem is 
certainly not unique to P-A theory.  Yet the promise of P-A theory, and what makes it 
analytically alluring, is that its parsimonious hypotheses will be more clearly directional 
and testable.  In its usage, however, P-A theory often becomes as analytically subjecti-
ve, fungible and difficult to test as alternative explanations, including less quantifiable 
variables like legitimacy, reputation and logics of appropriateness. 
Because we cannot operationalize many of the variables P-A theory relies on (like re-
lative slippage), we probably cannot falsify P-A theory. But we should be able to ascer-
tain whether relegislation, judges’ professional fears, or concern about cutting budgets 
are at some deep level motivating IO decision-making. To do this we must first resist 
the temptation to save P-A theory by folding into it factors that are not per se about the 
contacting relationship. This is especially important in delegation to IOs because states 
are at the same time 1) members of the collective Principal, 2) powerful actors with a 
variety of ways to exert political influence, and 3) the objects IOs are trying to influen-
ce. To be analytically clear, we need to focus on how much the first role--states as 
members of the Principal--matters when we assess P-A theory. To say that any sign of a 
state having power confirms P-A theory would be a mistake for four reasons.  First, 
usually a handful of unhappy states have no ability to actually wield their Principal po-
wer to sanction the IO, thus empirically it is usually false to presume that American or 
German influence is the same thing as a credible threat that Principals might recontract. 
Second, if we fold all mechanisms of power into the P-A framework, P-A theory will 
                                                 
1 Many scholars have argued that the ECJ systematically and very ambitiously orchestrated a fundamental trans-
formation of the European legal system. (Weiler 1991: ; Stein 1981: ; Rasmussen 1986: ; Burley and Mattli 1993) 
Jose Alvarez puts the ECJ in a category by itself in terms of its unusually bold activism (Alvarez 2003) Lawrence 
Helfer puts both the ECJ and the WTO into a special category because their rulings are more easily and likely en-
forced (Helfer 2003: 205). 
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become a garbage can theory of politics that amounts to little more than the widely 
known truths that states create IOs for good reasons, states have power in international 
relations, and actors relying on delegated authority (like all actors) seek where possible 
to avoid behavior that will provoke negative reactions. P-A theory potentially offers 
insight, and it should not be reduced to bland axiomatic claims.  Third, conflating all 
sources of state power with Principal power will make it harder to ascertain why some 
states have more or less influence, and why state influence varies by issue even when 
the recontracting rules and information context hold constant. Fourth, there are many 
types of power which have nothing to do with being a member of the recontracting col-
lective Principal and which are not unique to states. P-A theory puts Principals in a pri-
vileged category because only Principals write, and can rewrite, the contract. We need 
to know if this privilege is warranted, thus we need to know if being a Principal confers 
trumping, unique, hierarchical power.   
Before I proceed, let me clarify why I am focusing on ICs and on the political leve-
rage of recontracting tools. Because by all accounts courts are relatively independent 
“agents”, ICs are not the ideal case to reveal the limits of P-A theory. I focus on delega-
tion to International Courts because ICs are my area of research. But I hope that readers 
will not reduce this analysis to a claim that P-A theory does not work well for the case 
of ICs. I believe that the category of Trustees is larger than ICs. Also, the arguments 
about how international political factors undermine the usability of Principal control 
tools potentially have implications for delegation to international Agents as well as 
Trustees. While my focus on recontracting is admittedly a narrow operationalization of 
P-A theory, I believe the contract is the heart of P-A theory. One can always add enough 
things in to explain a dependent variable, for example one could model into the state-IC 
relationship that ICs have “reputational” concerns and concerns about non-compliance. 
But now we are not talking about states as Principals, or focusing on the fact that Prin-
cipals have delegated powers to the Agent in the form of contract that the Principal (and 
only the Principal) can alter. In my view, at the point add-ons unrelated to the contract 
are doing the heaving work, we are giving up the analytical relevance of the “contract” 
as the essential link providing Principal power and thus giving up the real value added 
of P-A theory. Instead we are back the a world of states and IOs, where Principal power 
is perhaps not even a central source of state influence. In other words, we are back in 
the world of international relations in general. 
II. ARE ICS “AGENTS” OR “TRUSTEES”?  
One reason P-A theory is intuitively compelling is that it hardly seems rational to dele-
gate meaningful power to highly independent actors who do not see themselves as one’s 
Agent. P-A theory can explain such delegation by drawing on the traditional rationalist 
argument that delegation to highly independent actors like constitutional courts and 
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central banks enhances the credibility of the Principal in the eyes of a third party (the 
public, or investors). The real question is what to do with this insight. 
Giandomenico Majone builds on this insight to distinguish credibility-enhancing de-
legation reasons from transaction cost delegation reasons, arguing that the logics of 
contract design and Agent selection vary for each type of delegation. Traditional A-
gents, Majone argues, are selected for transaction cost reasons--because their expertise 
or knowledge is more detailed than that of the Principal, or simply to harness their man-
power on behalf of the Principal. If the goal is simply to reduce transaction costs, it ma-
kes sense to select Agents based on whether they will be faithful and to design the dele-
gation contract to ensure the Agent stays faithful. For credibility-enhancing delegation, 
however, the best strategy may be to delegate to an Agent whose values visibly and 
systematically differ from that of the Principal. Also, to make the delegation commit-
ment credible, states may need to make these Agents highly independent and refrain 
from meddling because “an Agent bound to follow the directions of the delegating poli-
tician could not possibly enhance the commitment” (Majone 2001: 110).2  
Majone’s argument has been critiqued as creating a dichotomy that in practice does 
not exist (Pollack 2003: 31-2). States delegate to courts for a great variety of reasons—
some of which are transaction cost reducing (filling in contracts, monitoring, etc.), some 
of which are efforts to shift the blame for hard decisions onto other actors (Simmons 
2001), and some of which involve enhancing the credibility of the state through self-
binding (Moravcsik 1997).3 For ICs in specific, states delegate very different types of 
tasks—constitutional review, administrative review, criminal enforcement, and dispute 
resolution—not all of which are about enhancing the credibility of the state or require 
agent independence (Alter 2004). Pollack is right that the category of “delegation to 
enhance the credibility of a commitment” does not exist in isolation of other reasons to 
delegate. 
But Majone is right that the reason the “Agents” are selected matters. There are many 
mechanisms to help resolve disputes- some legal, some quasi legal, and some purely 
political. States delegate to courts because they want what such institutions deliver—
decision-making based on pre-existing rules, with a perception that the process is neut-
ral and not political. Delegation provides advantages precisely because states cannot 
control courts as a Principal controls an Agent. Any actor created through delegation 
that is 1) selected because of their personal and/or professional reputation; 2) given 
authority to make meaningful decisions according to the Trustee’s best judgment or the 
Trustee’s professional criteria; and 3) is making these decisions on behalf of a benefici-
                                                 
2 A similar argument about the need for Trustee autonomy can be found in Tallberg, 2003 p.11. 
3 For more on the reasons why states delegate to international courts, see: (Alter 2003) 
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ary (i.e. the general public, cancer patients, refugees as a category, etc.) fits this 
“Trustee” situation, regardless of whether the delegation is also reducing transaction 
costs for the Principal.  
Majone’s argument mainly endogenizes the variation P-A theory relies on, explai-
ning why Principals would design some Agents to be quite independent, and thus why 
certain Agents are in fact more independent. But the difference between Agents and 
Trustees goes beyond contract design.  Trustees bring into the delegation equation their 
own source of legitimacy (the reputation which led to their selection in the first place) 
(Franck 1990), an authority to make independent decisions based on independent pro-
fessional criteria, and a third-party beneficiary whom both the Trustee and the Principal 
want to convince.  The existence of the third party beneficiary means that the Princi-
pal’s position is no longer hierarchically supreme, rather both the Principal and the 
Trustee are trying to convince the third party audience that the behavior is legitimate. 
Indeed the Trustee really cannot only care about what the Principal wants; to cater to the 
author of the contract rather than the beneficiary of the trust would create a legitimacy 
problem for the Trustee.  The Principal also cannot only care about controlling the 
Trustee. The Trustee may in fact be deemed not just more efficient but actually a supe-
rior decision-maker, and efforts cast as “political interference” or exceeding state or 
Principal authority can alienate the Trustee’s constituency and members of the Principal 
whose support is needed for recontracting.  
Trustees who consistently and demonstrably exceed their mandate, compromising 
the interests of the beneficiary, can be dismissed. But the threshold for dismissal is 
high—single decisions that the Principal might have made differently are insufficient 
grounds for dismissal or reversal because Trustees are not political appointees who ser-
ve at the pleasure or on behalf of the Principal, rather they are supposed to make their 
own decisions according to best judgment or professional criteria. That said Trustees 
that repeatedly upset powerful actors can provoke a larger backlash which itself is likely 
counter to the interests of the Trustee or the beneficiary. 
P-A theory seeks to explain Agent behavior through its focus on the politics emana-
ting from the Principal’s fairly blunt sticks. Sticks generally work less well against ac-
tors who believe they are acting within their mandate, who are guided by strong profes-
sional norms, and who believe that their reputation or honor is on the line. The mandate, 
norms, and reputation of the Trustee also protect the Trustee from Principal recontrac-
ting as few want to sanction a Trustee for doing exactly what it was asked to do. The 
mandate, norms and reputation also constrain the Trustee from pursuing personal objec-
tives because the Trustee’s reputation protects them only so long as other members of 
the Principal and the beneficiary see the Trustee as acting appropriately and within its 
delegated zone of discretion. Thus we enter the world where “persuasion” and “legiti-
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macy of behavior” matters more than “tools of control,” where Trustees and Principals 
will need to justify their behavior to the beneficiary so that conflicts of interests will be 
cloaked in the language of contrasting interpretations rather than threats or sanctions, 
and where “logics of appropriateness” matter perhaps more than “logics of consequen-
ces”(March and Olsen 1999)—at least in terms of the consequences that fall on the 
Trustee personally. Table 1 below highlights the different politics lead to and emanating 
from delegation to Trustees compared to delegation to Agents. 
Table 1: Differences between Agents and Trustees 
 
 
Agent  Trustee 
Core Reason 
to delegate 
Transaction cost reasons:  Effi-
ciency gains of having the Agent 
oversee the delegated task.  
Credibility reasons:  To capture the 
benefits of the Trustee’s decision-
making reputation and/or to remove 
the taint of “politics” as shaping 
Trustee decision-making. 
Selection  
Criteria 
Principal will look for an Agent with 
similar values and views, an Agent 
who is trustworthy in addition to 
competent.  
Trustee selected because of their 
personal reputation, and/or because 
the norms of decision-making in the 
Trustee’s profession are perceived as 
“good” by the wider public.  
Expectations 
in Delegation 
Agents are expected to do the Prin-
cipal’s bidding, interpreting their 
mandate as the Principal would have 
wanted. 
Trustees are supposed to make deci-
sions on behalf of a beneficiary, 
using the guidelines in their mandate 
interpreted according to Trustee’s 
professional norms and best judg-
ment.  
Politics  
Manipulating material incentives of 
Agents (e.g. Principal tools of 
control) may be central to shaping 
Agent behavior.  
But it is also possible that the poli-
tics of persuasion, legitimacy, and 
influencing shared understandings 
may matter equally or more than 
material incentives in shaping P-A 
relations.    
Politics of persuasion, legitimacy, 
and influencing shared understan-
dings will be central to influencing 
P-T relations.  
Principal’s sanctioning “control 
tools” will be of little use when 
Trustees care more about their pro-
fessional reputation than about being 
fired or punished. 
 
Not all IOs are Trustees, but the Trustee category applies beyond courts, so long as the 
actor has been selected because of its reputation and delegated independent decision-
making power to act on behalf of a beneficiary. Seen through the lens of Trusteeship, a 
constitutional court is not the Agent of the legislature but the Trustee of the constitution 
on behalf of the demos. The World Health Organization (WHO) is the Trustee of the 
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public health on behalf of the people of the world. Central bankers are Trustees of the 
monetary supply, mandated to adopt anti-inflationary policies to assure firms that their 
investments and profits will not be eroded by inflation. Scientific agencies are the 
Trustees of science, advocating the particular policies that scientific research supports.  
The High Commissioner of Refugees is the guardian of refugees, doing what is best for 
the weak and dispossessed, not for powerful governments. Delegation to Trustees 
should not be seen as implying Principals are delegating to selfless saints or for altru-
istic reasons. Delegation is still serving the purposes of the Principal, and politics and 
political calculations still shape Trustee decision-making, sometimes running roughshod 
over the interests of the beneficiary.  
III. CAN STATES MITIGATE IC SLIPPAGE USING THEIR RECONTRACTING 
PRINCIPAL TOOLS OF CONTROL? 
Slippage is behavior that is unintended and undesired by the Principal, even if it is 
within the zone of discretion granted to the Trustee. For courts, the concern is not really 
that judges will shirk (i.e. refuse to decide cases or reject legal methods of decision-
making). Shirking is fairly easily rectified and extremely rare because it is seldom in the 
interest of the court either.  The real concern is that in politically contested cases ICs 
can award victories that litigants could not win in negotiations and essentially rewrite 
through interpretation the law that binds states. Reversing such slippage can be politi-
cally impossible because legislators can lack the political support to relegislate (Marks 
1989: ; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989). Even if a state-litigant chooses to ignore 
the ruling, the legal ruling itself can shift the political context by changing the status quo 
of what the law means in the eyes of others, and by labeling a state’s extant policy “ille-
gal” popular support for the policy can be undermined. It this ability of ICs to shift the 
meaning of international law and with it the political context that makes delegation to 
ICs so fundamentally transformative of international relations. One must only consider 
the Bush administration’s concerns about the International Criminal Court to know that 
states care greatly about this slippage risk, even if 999 times out of a thousand states are 
happy with the job ICs are doing.  
The previous section suggested theoretical reasons why Trustees might not be focu-
sed on anticipating Principal’s preferences in specific cases—because Trustees are 
asked to make decisions based on their best judgment and professional norms, because 
Trustees care more about their reputation than what the Principal wants, and because 
only decisions that clearly violate the interests of the beneficiary and exceed the manda-
te of the Trustee make the Trustee politically vulnerable to Principal retaliation. But 
even if these arguments are true, nothing stops the collective Principal from using its 
power to appoint, power of the purse or power to relegislate as tools to shape how the 
international judiciary exercises its decision-making authority. This section explains 
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why the traditional P-A control tools are not more politically effective in creating a 
controllable international judiciary, or in reversing IC slippage. While the analysis is 
focused on ICs in specific, the reason why Principal control tools are often ineffective 
has more to do with international politics than anything else. Even as Trustees ICs 
should be more subject to political influence compared to their domestic counterparts 
because of the short term appointments of IC judges.  Yet because states fear that IOs 
and international law will either come under control of the powerful, or be taken over by 
the weak, states have opted for decision-rules that hamper their ability as members of 
the collective Principal to wield the tools that remain within their prerogative to use. 
The difficulty in using remaining tools of control combined with IC judges seeing them-
selves as “trustees of international law” rather than agent’s of powerful international 
states, make judge-trustees far less likely than traditional IO-agents to focus on what the 
powerful states want. Powerful states know this only too well—which is why the US 
often refuses to sign justiciable international agreements, avoids ICs with “compulsory 
jurisdiction,” and why George Bush has gone to such lengths to challenge the ICC.  
Even if judges are “trustees” exercising their delegated power, the appointments pro-
cess can be a tool to “stack a court” in a certain direction, and the re-appointment or 
promotions process can be a source of ongoing political leverage over judges. A number 
of scholars have observed that appointments to international courts are hotly contested, 
and highly political (Steinberg 2004: ; Gordon et al. 1989), which is not the same thing 
as saying that International Courts are stacked in a certain direction. Because weak sta-
tes do not want the strong states to be able to stack an international court, there is no 
controllable international political process to shape who gets nominated international 
judicial positions--- rather each state is given unilateral control over who they nominate.  
Sometimes powerful countries can veto nominations at the point that judges are being 
selected from a pool of potential candidates. However, for regional ICs (e.g. the Euro-
pean Court of Justice, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the European 
Court of Human Rights) one judge from each member state will be selected and states 
accept whomever a country nominates. And even when there is a choice to be made and 
powerful states have virtual vetoes over who is selected, the level of screening of IC 
judicial candidates is inherently limited especially when the nominee is a law professor, 
domestic judge, or domestic civil servant whose decision-making is fairly hard to assess 
(Steinberg 2004: 264).  The ways ICs decide cases also blunts the effectiveness of the 
appointment process as a tool of control. While IC decisions are made based on a majo-
rity vote, many ICs prefer to or are required to issue their rulings unanimously, making 
monitoring of individual judges fairly hard.  Also, most IC rulings are actually made by 
small panels of judges and states generally have no control over which sub-set of judges 
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will hear their case.4  This means that to influence a court using the selection tool states 
would have to “correctly” influence the vast majority of international appointments—
not just their own appointee—in a context where the nominees are put forward by the 
nominating state and not through a collective process.  
It is even less likely that a fear of not being reappointed shapes judicial decision-
making. Often IC judges are not reappointed, but rarely if at all is it because of the deci-
sions they made on the bench. IC judges can be rotated out to create geographic repre-
sentation on the court, or to allow a different party or domestic political institution to 
have a turn appointing the judge. While IC judges could in theory still worry about their 
life after they serve their term, in practice the international judges I have interviewed 
have not been very worried about this. There is no international judicial career trajectory 
because the pool of international judicial appointments is simply too small5 and many 
IC judges are near retirement or see an appointment to an IC as a short term professional 
experience in any event. While there may well be isolated examples where a person did 
not get a job they wanted because of their association with an IC (though I know of no 
examples), whether a judge could anticipate these situations, let alone moderate their 
behavior to avoid the situation, is highly questionable. Even Richard Steinberg who 
believes that the US and Europe veto AB judges who they suspect will be activist does 
not argue that the concerns about reappointment lead judges to follow the wishes of the 
US or Europe (Steinberg 2004: 264). 
States can also exercise their influence by changing the delegation contract itself- 
cutting the court’s budget, changing the court’s mandate or jurisdiction, or legislatively 
overturning IC interpretations.  With the exception of criminal courts, cutting an IC 
budget is not an effective tool of control.  For most international litigation the greatest 
costs are borne by the parties who hire lawyers to assemble the case and assemble all of 
the factual material needed to support their position. The IC’s budget covers translation, 
and support staff. To cut an IC’s budget would mainly slow down the legal process and 
the multi-lingual and timely accessibility of rulings, which may make the legal process 
even less appealing but will not per se control how IC judges deal with the cases before 
them. International criminal courts are different in that the office of the prosecutor sha-
res the international criminal court’s budget. By manipulating the prosecutor’s budget 
and helping or hindering the prosecutor, states can influence which crimes are investiga-
                                                 
4 This is not true for the panel stage for the WTO where states can select panelists. Also for ICJ cases where states 
have not consented to compulsory jurisdiction, states can participate in selecting the sub-set of judges who will 
hear their case. (Art. 31 Statute of the International Court of Justice describing the appointment of ad hoc judges.) 
5 There are twenty-one courts, with about 200 appointees from around the world who could be described as being 
“international judges and 191 states belonging to the United Nations. (Alvarez 2003: 2),  
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ted and whether or not the prosecutor can assemble a winnable court case.  While the 
budget probably does not effect how the IC ultimately rules, it likely does effect which 
cases are brought to the court in the first place. 
Changing the mandate of an IC could potentially be effective, if it were in fact pos-
sible. Changing an international treaty requires unanimous support of every state—a 
threshold that is very hard to reach.   Sanctioning an IC also requires building a political 
coalition of states.  Countries committed to the norm of judicial independence as a mat-
ter of principle resist efforts to punish an IC for acting within its zone of discretion. 
Weaker states hesitate to dilute the autonomy of an IC as they benefit from having an 
international forum in which power is equalized. And powerful states hesitate to give up 
their veto right because the weaker states are more numerous.  
The ECJ is the only case I am aware of where states attempted to change the ECJ’s 
jurisdiction and authority because (according to a British representative) the ECJ was 
creating “significant unforeseen consequences for member states [that] have been 
disproportionate in their effect and have created severe practical problems”(Tallberg 
2003: 119). This view seemed to have support in Germany, where German Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl publicly accused the ECJ of activism, noting “we have an example of so-
mething that was not wanted from the beginning.  This should be discussed so that the 
necessary measures can be taken.” (Tallberg 2003: 118). Specific sanctioning proposals 
were offered, though the actual proposals were relatively tame. British Euro-skeptics 
had publicly leaked that the government wanted to “clip the court’s wings” and would 
propose a political veto of the ECJ be created.  The idea, however, never left the UK 
home office because it would have been flatly rejected by other states.6  Instead Britain 
suggested that governments create time or state liability limits for EU law, an appeals 
process, limitations on retrospective effects, and the right to accelerate the legal process. 
None of these proposals came even close to passing.   Jonas Tallberg notes that “The 
majority of the members in the reflection group were not prepared to back the UK pro-
posals… no single proposal ever gathered the support of a majority, never mind the u-
nanimity required for treaty revision.”(Tallberg 2003: 120)7  The EU may be somewhat 
exceptional because it is composed of liberal states committed to judicial independence 
and supranationalism (Rubenfeld 2003), and therefore perhaps unusually respectful of 
                                                 
6 “Government to demand curb on European Court.” By Kevin Brown, Financial Times, 2 February 1995, p.9). In 
interviews in the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials knew of the idea, but never seriously con-
sidered it because it would never pass (10 November 1995, London). 
7 This case is discussed in much more detail by Tallberg.  See also Alter, 2001 (Chapter 5) and Alter 1998. 
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judicial independence.8 While I am aware of countries that have withdrawn from IC 
jurisdiction to protest IC rulings and IC independence (Helfer 2002), I am unaware of 
any example of states collectively revoking or circumscribing the jurisdiction of an IC. 
It is in practice more common to find an IC’s jurisdiction extended than the inverse.  
Cases of relegislation to reverse an IC ruling, while not unheard of, are also surpri-
singly rare. Indeed, in the EU, where in some cases only a qualified majority is needed 
to relegislate, there are only four known examples of legislation intentionally added to 
counteract an ECJ decision, examples that are not per se “sanctions” in light of undue 
activism.9  There are few examples of relegislation because states tend to disagree about 
which policy is best, and thus are unable to unite behind an alternative interpretation. 
For example, we find that unified developing country outrage at a WTO appellate body 
ruling regarding amicus briefs has led to blocked efforts to reform the WTO dispute 
resolution mechanisms, but not a reversal of the amicus brief ruling, in large part becau-
se the US and Europe are happy with amicus briefs being allowed. US anger at the ICJ’s 
Nicaragua ruling (discussed below) led to the withdrawal of the US from the ICJ’s 
compulsory jurisdiction, but no change in international law regarding the use of force. 
And even though many European countries were unhappy about the costs of the ECJ’s 
Barber ruling equalizing the retirement ages of men and women, states were only able 
to limit the ruling’s retrospective effects, so the decision itself was not reversed. Argu-
ably ICs hesitate to aggressively apply legal principles that generate great controversy, 
but the law in question and the legal interpretations remain on the books to be dusted off 
when political tempers cool or in a less contentious political context. Institutions change 
over time through reinterpretation of statutes, by shifting the emphasis from one provi-
sion in a statute to another, or by seizing on and giving new life to moribund yet latent 
                                                 
8 A few ICs have political mechanisms to reverse IC judgments. WTO panel rulings and AB decisions can be 
rejected on unanimous vote of the Dispute Settlement Body, and ICC decisions can be set aside by an assembly 
(Rome Statute Article 119). The voting rule to use these mechanisms remains very high so that the more numer-
ous developing countries cannot unseat rulings or decisions that powerful countries want. In practice these 
mechanisms have never been used, and they are considered to be largely ineffective. 
9 The Barber protocol is discussed in this paragraph. The ECJ’s Grogan ruling challenging Irish policies that limit 
people from traveling to Britain to get an abortion was not reversed in law or in fact, rather a protocol was added 
to the Treaty on the European Union saying that nothing in the EU treaties could undermine Ireland’s constitu-
tional provisions regarding abortion.  When the ECJ ruled against a German affirmative action policy (in the 
Kalanke ruling) on the basis that the EC directive disallowed such policies, states corrected the directive. And 
two declarations were added to the organization of German, Austrian, and Luxembourg public credit unions to 
counteract an ECJ ruling regarding competition law. These cases are discussed briefly in (Chalmers 2004: 15, 
notes 55-56) 
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statutes and roles (Pierson 2004: ; Thelen 2004).  It is significant that the legal princi-
pals stay on the books because they may well be used in the future as authoritative sour-
ces of precedent.   
It is not impossible that Principal tools of control can work, yet the way states have 
organized international institutions—requiring diverse membership within IO bureauc-
racies, allowing national nomination of international appointments, and requiring una-
nimity to legislate anew—makes it hard for Principal control tools to be used effective-
ly. We do not see states improve their “tools of control” not because the tools work or 
Principals are happy with the status quo, but rather because potential solutions have 
greater downsides than the benefit of potentially being able to use the control tools to 
mitigate IC slippage. A requirement that all national nominations to international courts 
be collectively made would set a precedent about external interference in an area of na-
tional choice and national representation that few would want. While one could imagine 
monitoring mechanisms for judicial appointees—like selecting only people with inter-
national reputations that can be scrutinized—any requirement would limit what is alrea-
dy a very limited pool of people with fluency in the language of deliberation, competen-
ce in international law, and the time and desire to serve. Finally, states tend to disagree 
amongst themselves as to what is and is not “slippage” and about how to remedy such 
slippage. These reasons are behind Richard Steinberg’s assessment that even though 
concern about judicial law-making has been raised seventy times by representatives of 
fifty-five WTO member states in the last ten years (p. 256), and a number of political 
reforms have been offered, these reforms “are untenable politically” and unlikely to be 
adopted (Steinberg 2004: 273-4). 
Majone’s argument was that Trustees are purposely designed to be independent.  
Certainly the difficulty in dismissing judges mid-term is by design, to help protect the 
independence of judges. But the difficulty of using the appointment process to shape IC 
decision-making, the unwillingness of states to cede their veto rights to facilitate rele-
gislation, and the unwillingness of states to subject IC decisions to a veto by some ver-
sion of qualified majority, are artifacts of a deep normative support for judicial indepen-
dence combined with international power politics.   
IV. TESTING WHETHER CONTRACTING THREATS INFLUENCE IC 
BEHAVIOR 
If not contracting concerns, what is shaping IC decision-making? ICs seek to build their 
reputation as non-political legal decision-makers while endeavoring compliance with 
the law.  The way judges build their reputation is by striving to ensure their decisions 
are seen as procedurally fair, unbiased with respect to the parties to the suit, and suppor-
table with legal reasoning (Gibson and Caldeira 1995: , 1992). Meanwhile especially 
international judges are concerned about “endeavoring compliance” with international 
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law. In domestic legal systems states back up court rulings with enforcement mecha-
nisms, and exit from the law and the political system is costly, thus judges need not 
worry too much about endeavoring compliance with the law.  In the international realm, 
enforcement mechanisms for international law are partial at best, and exit through non-
compliance is always a live option. The goal of ICs is neither to punish states for having 
broken international law10 nor to elicit compliance with legal rulings at any cost. The 
larger aim of international law and international legal mechanisms is to encourage and 
prod states to respect their international legal commitments. If a state chooses not to 
comply with the legal ruling, it is not necessarily a stain on the court’s reputation or 
authority.11 But since the larger goal is to facilitate future compliance with the law, ICs 
are often willing to work with governments towards the goal of eventual compliance.  
The goals of building a court’s reputation through legal fidelity and endeavoring 
compliance can be in tension with each other. The art of judging is to balance these two 
objectives, and the correct balance of the two is something that judges, politicians and 
pundits will often disagree about.  Indeed most of legal politics is oriented around nego-
tiating and influencing this balancing act. Governments, NGOs and legal scholars try to 
convince judges and the public that certain interpretations of the law will be preferable 
on normative, legal, or political grounds. Governments, as parties to the suit, and third 
parties able to participate in international legal proceedings, try to shape how the law is 
understood, and influence how international legal rulings are interpreted, playing to the 
incentives and reputation of the IC itself.  And states pull on the desire of ICs to endea-
vor compliance, trying to persuade judges that certain interpretations would be political-
ly impossible or normatively illegitimate in their country.  
                                                 
10 With the exception of international criminal law, most international legal systems do not retrospectively punish 
states for violating the law.  For example, the WTO allows retaliation only for continued violation of WTO, not to 
compensate for past violation.  The European Court of Human Rights authorizes compensation for litigant that 
wins their case, but no punitive damages or compensation for other victims of the illegal behavior. With the nar-
row exception of non-implementation of an EC directive in a timely fashion, ECJ decisions only carry sanctions 
when  member state continue to defy an ECJ ruling. 
11 Some P-A scholars have incorporated non-compliance into their framework by arguing that noncompliance is a 
stain on the court’s reputation and authority, and thus a punishment ICs seek to avoid. I disagree. Most non-
compliance (compensated or otherwise) is politically invisible and does not harm the IC’s authority one way or 
another. Rampant non-compliance undermines the authority of the whole legal order, but most observers con-
clude that the law or political system itself is the problem, not the court, and they blame political leaders or non-
complying actors. Courts may even ‘choose’ non-compliance, issuing rulings that they know will be ignored be-
cause they prefer to prioritize the legal principle and their own reputation for legal decision-making. 
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Three aspects of this interpretive politics are worth underscoring. P-A theory expects 
Principals to be in a hierarchically privileged position compared to any other actor be-
cause of their unique power to recontract.  But in the legitimacy politics of interpreting 
the law, judges are in a privileged position (at least once a case is in court) because they 
ultimately decide the case and there is a heavy presumption that their decision is legally 
authoritative. Second—states may have more resources than non-state actors in these 
interpretive politics (non-state actors may be excluded from arguing in court, and go-
vernments may be better able to shape media coverage than are non-state actors). But 
being a member of the collective Principal does not in itself lead to unique influence let 
alone political control over the legitimacy politics of persuasion or over how the legal 
ruling will be understood by the so-called “international community.”12 Third—the ve-
nue and deliberative style in which interpretive politics takes place is very different than 
the negotiating table dominated by the Principal.  Courtroom politics take place in an 
environment highly constrained by law and legal procedure, where judges have a privi-
leged position because they get to ask the questions, decide what is and is not relevant, 
and determine the outcome.  The post-ruling legitimacy politics take place in the public 
arena where the audience is the Trustee’s beneficiary, not the Principals themselves, and 
where states are joined by other non-state actors in trying to influence the larger public 
debate. 
The next three cases suggest the validity of this alternative argument but mainly sub-
stantiate the claim that ICs can slip without engendering reversal or sanction, and this 
slippage can be politically meaningful, shaping the behavior of states and international 
politics more generally. The first case-- the WTO “unforeseen developments” case—
represents slippage that shifted WTO rules for safeguard protections, changed US  poli-
cies, and altered the political context in which reforms to the Safeguard Agreement will 
be negotiated. The second case—the ECJ’s rulings regarding gender discrimination in 
the military—shows slippage over time where incremental developments over twenty 
years contributed to the ECJ entering into a sensitive domain of national authority with 
relatively little controversy and significant transformative effects. The third case--the 
ICJ and the US mining of the harbors of Nicaragua—shows slippage that directly 
contradicts the expectations of P-A theory because the IC ruled against a super-power 
                                                 
12 Indeed Ian Johnstone has shown how the UN Secretary General uses its legal authority and bully pulpit to influ-
ence state behaviour, Jonas Tallberg and Susanne Schmit have shown how the European Commission can use the 
European legal system to pressure states, and Kathryn Sikkink has shown how non-state actors have drawn on in-
ternational norms to build political pressure from below, forcing governments to change their practices. 
(Johnstone 2003), (Tallberg 2003: ; Schmidt 2000) (Sikkink and Lutz 2001: ; Keck and Sikkink 1998: ; Risse, 
Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). 
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where it knew it would be sanctioned and the ruling ignored.  The ICJ’s ruling was 
ignored in this case, but I still use this example because it supports the “trustee” argu-
ment by suggesting that sanctioning concerns are not foremost on the mind of judges 
deciding hard cases.  
Case Study 1: WTO Unforeseen Developments Case 
Because many forms of trade protection have been eliminated through the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and now the World Trade Organization, some 
countries have turned to anti-dumping and safeguard measures as a tool of protection.  
Use of these tools is regulated by WTO rules.  GATT rules up until the Uruguay round 
negotiations required a country adopting safeguard measures to compensate those 
countries hurt by their measures, or face retaliatory sanctions. Adopted in 1994, the new 
Safeguard Agreement eliminated the right to retaliate or seek compensation for the a-
doption of safeguard measures so long as the safeguard provisions were to last less than 
three years (Lawrence and Stankard 2001).13  A number of countries were unhappy with 
the Uruguay round agreement regarding both dumping and safeguard measures, belie-
ving that the agreements did no go far enough to address abusive use of these tools.  But 
according to Mickey Kantor, the chief negotiator of the US during the Uruguay Round 
negotiations, the United States threatened to walk out at the last minute “unless our tra-
de laws and philosophical underpinnings were preserved.”(Greene 2001: 1)   
In 1997 Argentina invoked WTO Safeguard provisions to impose duties on imports 
of European footwear, an action that was challenged by the EU.  In dispute were the 
conditions under which the safeguard measure can be invoked.  Article XIX of GATT 
1994 allows “Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products” if unforeseen deve-
lopments lead to or threaten to lead to “serious injury to domestic producers.” But the 
Agreement on Safeguards has no mention of the requirement that the disruption be “un-
foreseen.” Argentina contended that the injury in itself was “unforeseen.” Argentina 
also argued that an investigation of the negotiating history of the Safeguard provision 
reveals that negotiators had intentionally not required that injury be “unforeseen.” Ar-
gentina pointed out that the EU itself seemed to share this understanding of the Safegu-
ard agreement, since it removed from domestic legislation any requirement that the da-
mage be “unforeseen.” The panel agreed with Argentina, but the WTO’s Appellate Bo-
dy (AB) did not. In December of 1999, the Appellate Body reversed the panel ruling, 
arguing that the terms of the WTO agreement must be understood together.  In essence 
the AB created a legal hierarchy among WTO provisions, putting the language of Artic-
                                                 
13 To avoid compensation, countries had often negotiated Voluntary Export Agreements, which violate GATT rules.  
The right to compensation for safeguard provisions was eliminated in hopes that it would end the practice of ne-
gotiating voluntary export agreements. 
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le XIX of GATT over that of other aspects of the GATT agreement, including over the 
Agreement on Safeguards.  The AB ordered that any imposition of safeguard measures 
subsequent to the GATT 1994 agreement meet the test to show that the damage was 
unforeseen.14 
The US had participated as a third party in the footwear dispute, arguing that balan-
cing conflicting language of Article XIX and the safeguard measure was the job of poli-
ticians. Any tensions in the terms of the agreement, it argued, should be resolved 
through diplomatic negotiation (p. 19). The US was especially interested in the issue of 
“unforeseen developments” because it uses safeguards to protect industries facing signi-
ficant import pressure.  As in Europe, US law did not require the International Trade 
Commission (ITC) document that “unforeseen developments” were creating of the trade 
disruption.  The ITC merely had to conclude that no other cause was greater than the 
rise in imports in causing the injury (Lawrence and Stankard 2001).    In 1999, just a-
bout the time that Argentina’s safeguard measures were condemned, the United States 
implemented safeguard measures for three years against Australian and New Zealand 
lamb imports. The US claimed that the composition of Australian and New Zealand 
imports had changed, creating serious damage to US industry. These measures were 
immediately challenged using the argument that the US had failed to show that the lamb 
market disruption was “unforeseen.”   
The WTO panel applied the AB’s footwear precedent and determined that the US 
had failed to justify that the circumstances leading to the disrupted lamb meat market 
were unforeseen.  The US appealed the panel ruling arguing that the panel nullified the 
difference between the “conditions” for applying a safeguard measure (which were set 
in the footwear case) and the “circumstances” which must be demonstrated in order to 
apply a safeguard measure, which is what the panel condemned (p.5-6). At issue was 
whether or not the panel could question how the relevant United States court conducted 
its fact finding. The US argued that the ITC report demonstrated that the existence as a 
matter of fact that “unforeseen developments” merited the application of safeguard pro-
visions.  Australia argued that the ITC report did not justify this finding, and thus the 
report itself was not enough to show a factual condition of “unforeseen developments.”  
The AB sided with Australia, finding that the ITC must demonstrate in its finding that 
unforeseen developments existed.  
Together these two cases are noteworthy in a couple of respects.  First, this is a clear 
case of the AB making law. Terence Stewart, Patrick McDonough and Marta Prado note 
that the AB “breathed live back into” the concept of “unforeseen developments” which 
                                                 
14 Argentina – Safeguard Measures On Imports Of Footwear WT/DS121/AB/R Report of the Appellate Body 14 
December 1999. 
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many members had considered a “dead letter” of the 1947 and 1994 GATT agreements 
(Stewart, McDonough, and Prado 2000: 661)—dead because GATT panels had not read 
Article XIX as requiring that states show that damages were unforeseen. Even more, the 
AB added this requirement to the Safeguard Agreement, even though it appears that the 
requirement that injury be “unforeseen” was intentionally excluded from the Safeguard 
Agreement. While the collective Principal did not agree to the requirement that states 
show that damages were unforeseen before they legally impose safeguard position, it is 
also hard to say that the “Principal” opposed the AB jurisprudence. All we can say is 
that the AB used its interpretive space to shift the status quo meaning of WTO law in a 
way that some countries probably prefer but could not win in political negotiations, and 
this shifting upset some members including the United States. The anger was enough to 
pressure the United States Trade Representative to articulate a “strategy” to counter 
“faulty WTO decisions” regarding safeguard provisions (U.S. sets strategy to address 
'faulty' WTO decisions 2003). 
Second, in requiring the ITC to demonstrate in its ruling that the trade developments 
were “unforeseen,” the AB’s Lamb Meat ruling seemingly reversed the accepted norm 
that states should be trusted to have made reasonable factual findings. The extent to 
which states should be trusted in their factual findings is labeled, in legal terms, the 
“standard of review.” The issue of the standard of review is in no ways unique to the 
WTO, and there is no one answer to the question “what should be the standard of re-
view.” John Jackson and Steven Croley show that there was no clear GATT era ju-
risprudence regarding the “standard of review.” The 1951 Hatter’s fur ruling seemed to 
grant quite a bit of deference to national governments, requiring a challenger to show 
that national factual interpretation was “clearly unreasonably great” before the GATT 
panel would question its validity.15 The Hatter’s fur precedent was invoked by both Ar-
gentina and the United States who argued that the Hatter’s fur precedent implied that 
damages severe enough to warrant safeguard protection were ipso facto unforeseen.  
But this deference had contributed to making the “unforeseen development” aspect of 
GATT law a dead letter, and it was rejected by the AB. 
While subsequent GATT panels had sometimes been more willing to require some 
justification of the domestic fact finding, there was no accepted practice requiring states 
to demonstrate the validity of their factual findings regarding the source of economic 
damage to domestic industry. Writing in 1996 Croley and Jackson could only identify 
                                                 
15 GATT Dispute Settlement Panel, "Hatter's Fur Case", Report On The Withdrawal By The United States Of A 
Tariff Concession Under Article Xix Of The GATT, 1951, Paras. 8-14, cited in WTO Dispute Procedures, Stan-
dard Of Review, And Deference To National Governments (Croley and Jackson 1996: 196) 
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the “standard of review” issue as something the Appellate Body would need to address, 
and advise caution:  
panels should be cautious about adopting "activist" postures in the GATT/WTO con-
text. For one thing, the international system and its dispute settlement procedures, in 
stark contrast to most national systems, depend heavily on voluntary compliance by par-
ticipating members. Inappropriate panel "activism" could well alienate members, thus 
threatening the stability of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedure itself.  Rela-
tedly, panels should recognize that voluntary compliance with panel reports is grounded 
in the perception that panel decisions are fair, unbiased and rationally articulated 
(Croley and Jackson 1996: 212) 
Let me underscore that their concern was not recontracting but rather the fragility of the 
dispute settlement procedure itself and the need to show the rationality, impartiality and 
legal fidelity of the decision while endeavoring compliance with AB rulings.  
The United States did respect the Lamb Meat decision. It took the full time allowed 
under WTO rules to bring its policy into accordance with the Appellate Body ruling, but 
in November 2001 it removed its safeguard protections, 9 months before they were set 
to expire (US ends lamb import quotas 2001).  Because of domestic pressure, the US 
had to replace the safeguard protections (which did not require any public expenditure) 
with a subsidy program that cost  42.7 million dollars (US ends lamb import quotas 
2001). Between October 2001 when safeguard protection was still in place, and May 
2002 after protection was lifted, lamb imports rose 24%-- New Zealand lamb imports 
increased 43%, and Australia’s imports 11% (WTO win widens US lamb market 2002). 
The Lamb Meat case was not the only safeguards case the US lost in front of the WTO. 
By 2001, the US had lost five out of six cases where US measures were challenged in 
front of the WTO the US (though not always because of “unforeseen developments) 
(Lawrence and Stankard 2001).  
As mentioned, there is pressure within the US to renegotiate the Safeguard Agree-
ment to allow the US to win more cases (U.S. sets strategy to address 'faulty' WTO de-
cisions 2003: ; Ledet 2003).  Whether the US actually will re-open negotiations, let alo-
ne succeed in removing the parts of WTO law it dislikes, is yet to be seen. Until recent-
ly the US had a defensive position that Safeguard and Anti-Dumping agreements were 
not open to renegotiation, mainly because developing countries wanted to open negotia-
tions so as to strengthen their ability to use the WTO system to counter abusive imposi-
tion of anti-dumping and safeguard practices. If the US tries to renegotiate the Safegu-
ard agreement it would open the agreement up to changes it may not like, and it would 
face steep opposition from developing countries.  To win its fight in the context of what 
is called the Doha Development Round would take considerable political resources. To 
hold the status quo line requires almost no resources.  
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Case 2: The ECJ and Women in Combat-Related Roles 
The European Union is primarily about facilitating peaceful cooperation among Euro-
pean countries and building a common market.  Yet included in the Treaty of Rome is a 
stipulation that in this common market there must be equal pay for men and women 
(Article 119).  This social objective came to be part of the Common Market for econo-
mic reasons: France was required by its constitution to pay men and women equally, 
and it did not want other countries to gain a competitive advantage by relying on inex-
pensive female labor (Hoskins 1996: Chapter 3). In the 1970s, with Social Democratic 
governments in power in a number of European countries and activist members within 
the European Commission, a directive extending equal pay to include equal treatment 
for men and women was adopted. Directives are binding in the end to be achieved, and 
they allow for national choice in how to achieve the directive’s goal. Article 2(2) of the 
Equal Treatment directive allowed for derogations to the requirement of equal treat-
ment, noting: 
This Directive shall be without prejudice to the right of Member States to exclude 
from its field of application those occupational activities and, where appropriate, the 
training leading thereto, for which by reason of their nature or the context in which they 
are carried out, the sex of the worker constitutes a determining factor.16 
British and German law explicitly allow derogations to the requirement of equal treat-
ment for the military. Article 85 (4) of the United Kingdom’s 1975 Sex Discrimination 
Act states: “nothing in this Act shall render unlawful an act done for the purpose of en-
suring the combat effectiveness of the naval, military or air forces.” In Germany women 
were only allowed to serve in the band, or in the medical services, and by a provision in 
the German Constitution (the Basic Law) were explicitly prohibited from “render[ing] 
service involving the use of arms.”(German Basic Law Article 12 a (4)). These excepti-
ons were arguably consistent with Article 2(2) of the Equal Treatment Directive, and 
were never challenged by the European Commission as a violation of European law 
probably because the realm of the national security remained firmly a national issue and 
a policy area where sex discrimination had long accepted as the norm.  
Enter the European Court of Justice. Directives are only binding in the end to be a-
chieved, and there was in European law no legal standing for private litigants to invoke 
directives in national courts to challenge a national policy.  This meant that only the 
Commission could challenge a Member State decision to exclude a policy area from 
falling under the Equal Treatment Directive. In 1974 the ECJ ruled in Van Duyn that 
directives can, in certain situations, create direct effects so that private litigants can so-
                                                 
16 Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on Equal Treatment for Men and omen in Employment.  OJ 
[1976] L 39/40. 
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metimes draw directly on directives to challenge national laws.17 The ECJ’s Van Duyn 
jurisprudence provoked revolts by the German Federal Tax Court and the French Con-
seil d’Etat, each of which argued that the ECJ was exceeding its authority and transfor-
ming the legal tool of a “directive” into the legal form of a “regulation” (which is direct-
ly effective and explicitly binding).  Eventually, however, the notion that directives 
could create direct effect was accepted (Alter 2001: 98-104, 151-157). Also in the late 
1970s and 1980s, drawing on cases raised by women’s groups seeking to enforce the 
Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome and the Equal Treatment directive, the European 
Court of Justice developed an extensive case law on equal pay and equal treatment  
(Hoskins 1996).  Many if not most of these developments were quite unforeseen when 
the Article 119 and the subsequent directive were adopted, and at times the develop-
ments were unwelcome by governments that did not share the equal treatment agendas 
enshrined in European law (Alter and Vargas 2000). This ECJ case law had become 
well accepted by the 1990s, to the point that it was no longer controversial. 
In 1994 Angela Maria Sirdar was denied a job as a cook in the British Royal Mari-
nes, because the Royal Marines did not recruit women except to serve in the Royal 
Band. Sirdar argued that her exclusion as a cook violated European Law. In the Sirdar 
Case, the ECJ accepted the argument that the Royal Marines can exclude women becau-
se they are “special force” within the British Military relying on the military cohesion of 
its all male membership.18  The Sirdar ruling did not require a change in British policy, 
but it signaled that the ECJ would be involved in reviewing employment rules within 
the military—a domain that had previously been seen as remaining within the exclusive 
prerogatives of member states.  
In 1996 Tanja Kreil applied for a job in the German Bundeswehr in weapon electro-
nics maintenance. Like Sirdar, Kreil wanted a combat supportive role, but Kreil’s role 
required working with arms- something expressly prohibited in the German Basic Law. 
In the suit before the ECJ, the German, Italian and United Kingdom governments all 
argued that decisions concerning the organization and combat capacity of the armed 
forces lay outside the scope of Community law (Points 12-13 summarized in the ECJ 
ruling).  The European Court rejected this argument, asserting that “Although it is for 
the Member States..to take decisions on the organisation of their armed forces, it does 
not follow that such decisions must fall entirely outside the scope of Community law.” 
Instead the ECJ required states to justify any derogation from the general requirement of 
equal treatment for men and women.  Whereas the ECJ accepted the derogation justifi-
cation in the Sirdar case, in the Kreil case it found that the blanket exclusion of women 
                                                 
17 Van Duyn v.  Home Office, ECJ case 41/74, [1974] ECR 1337. 
18 Sirdar v. Army Board, Case C-273/97, 1999 E.C.R. I-7403, [1999] 3 C.M.L.R. 559 (1999) 
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from many roles in the German military violated the European Communities equal 
treatment directive.19 
The equal treatment substance of the ruling was not novel, but its application to the 
realm of a state’s military was a big step.  Still, the decision was not wholly unwelcome. 
A number of actors in Germany had been advocating for years that women should be 
allowed to play greater roles in the Bundeswehr. In the 1970s, notwithstanding the Eu-
ropean Community’s Equal Treatment directive, opposition from women’s groups, pea-
ce movements and the military itself limited reformers from expanding the role for wo-
men beyond serving in the medical services and the band (Liebert 2002: 13).20 But by 
the late 1990s German soldiers were already serving alongside women servicewomen 
from NATO countries, contributing to shifts in soldier’s attitudes. Moreover, the Ger-
man Bundeswehr was under significant stress because German troops were starting to 
be deployed in international missions.  Since German conscripts may not be sent out of 
Germany, the German military’s volunteer army needed to expand. The peace move-
ment had been a chief opponent of a greater role for women, mainly because without an 
army of sufficient size, deployment would not be an option (Liebert 2002: 13). But the 
ability of Germany’s Red-Green coalition to actually deploy the German military in 
NATO and UN out-of-area operations signaled a defeat of the peace movement and a 
change in German attitudes.  
While the time for a change was ripe, German policy would not have changed 
without the ECJ decision—at least not when it changed. Writing in Die Zeit the week of 
the ECJ decision, Constanze Stelzenmüller argued that it was not a question of “if” 
Germany would change its constitution--- since it must in light of the ECJ ruling—but 
rather how Germany would change its constitution (Stelzenmüller 2000). Gerhard 
Kuemmel concurs with the idea that the ECJ decision was the catalyst: “recent steps to 
open the Bundeswehr to women do not stem from genuinely political initiatives as one 
may have thought, but from a court ruling that required to political sphere to take some 
action.”(Kuemmel 2003: 4) Changing the German Constitution did not, in the end, pro-
ve that difficult, in large part because the German government embraced the idea ex-
panding the role of women in the military.  Only one member of the Bundestag spoke 
against the ECJ decision as “a clear transgression” because the domain of the military 
did not fall under European Union authority (Liebert 2002: 16).  Within ten months of 
                                                 
19 Tanja Kreil v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Case C-285/98, 2000 E.C.R. I-69. 
20 A 1973 initiative of the Social Democratic party in Germany had led to the partial opening to women in 1975—
allowing women to serve in the medical services.   This extension both helped the Social Democrats  trumpet 
“The Year of the Woman” and relieve a shortage of medical service staff in the Bundeswehr. In 1991 the right to 
serve in the band was extended to women (Kuemmel 2003: 3). 
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the ruling Germany had changed its constitution, and initiated an extensive transforma-
tion of the German military, allowing in women and working to  shift social attitudes of 
soldiers so as to dismantle resistance to women in the military(Kuemmel 2003).  The 
number of women in the military went from 4173 in 1999 to 7734 in 2002, with 2752 
women serving in armed troops (Liebert 2002: 9-10), and we are only beginning to un-
derstand the larger impact this change will bring (Kuemmel 2003).  
That Germany seemingly welcomed the ECJ decision as a helpful catalyst for needed 
changes does not undermine the point that the ECJ decision was well beyond what sta-
tes intended when Article 119 and the Equal Treaty directive were written, and beyond 
what they would have themselves chosen.  European countries could always, on their 
own, decide to integrate women into the military. Together the Sirdar and Kreil rulings 
forced governments to defend their choices in an area of national prerogative and made 
the ECJ the final judge on whether or not restrictions on women in the military are legal 
(Harries-Jenkins 2002: 764). The ECJ showed skillful judicial diplomacy in its jurisdic-
tional expansion.  To rule against the Royal Marines would have been politically explo-
sive.  Moreover, by first allowing the derogation to equal treatment for the Royal Mari-
nes, the ECJ could reassure states that it was not going to be a radical force of change. 
The Kreil ruling was followed three years later by the ECJ’s Dory ruling where the ECJ 
qualified even more the extent to which it would interfere in national choices regarding 
the organization of the military.  Dory argued that in light of the ECJ’s Kreil ruling, it 
was inconsistent to exempt women from compulsory military service.  The ECJ reasser-
ted its Kreil precedent that the area of national security is not immune from ECJ over-
sight, but found state decisions about the choices of military organization and conscrip-
tion remain national decisions(Szyszczak 2003).21 I would argue that this decision was 
not a reversal of Kreil, a response to political pressure, or a sign of concerns about re-
contracting.  Rather all judges recognize that certain types of decisions are for political 
bodies to make. Given how intentional member states have been about keeping the ECJ 
out of the sphere of state security,22 and the issue of equal treatment separate from issues 
related to the military, and given the symbolism involved in any EU decision that tou-
ches on national defenses, it is highly doubtful that, if asked, European states would 
have agreed to let the ECJ be involved at all with decision regarding the organization of 
domestic security.  
                                                 
21 Case C-186/01 Alexander Dory v Federal Republic of Germany, judgment of 11 March 2003 
22 The ECJ was excluded from any role in the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and its role in reviewing issues 
regarding asylum and immigration is circumscribed so as to allow states to maintain final authority where issues 
of state security are concerned. 
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Case Study 3: The ICJ, the US, and the Mining of Nicaragua’s harbors 
In January 1984, the government of Nicaragua decided to sue the United States in front 
of the ICJ for supporting a rebel movement aimed at overthrowing the government of 
Nicaragua. Having learned of the impending suit US Secretary of State George Shultz 
wrote a letter informing the UN that the US was withdrawing from the compulsory ju-
risdiction of the ICJ, but only with respect to Central American countries (Reichler 
2001: 31). The US then sought a summary dismissal of the suit. If there was ever any 
doubt of how the Reagan administration would respond, George Shultz’s letter and the 
US’s attempt to have the suit dismissed for lack of ICJ competence made it clear that 
the Reagan administration would reject any ICJ ruling on the merits of the case.  
On May 10, 1984 the ICJ unanimously rejected the US appeal to summarily dismiss 
the suit and ordered the US to cease and desist in its mining of the Nicaraguan harbors.23 
In the subsequent jurisdiction phase of the Nicaragua case the US government raised 
again the arguments that Nicaragua had never formally submitted its ratification of the 
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), thus the US was not 
bound to participate in proceedings.24 It claimed that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction to deci-
de on issues regarding the use of force, and specifically whether or not US action was 
“self defense.”  The US argument was that it was involved in “collective self-defense” 
aiding the countries in the region, including El Salvador, and that it had withdrawn from 
the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction for cases from Central America. The ICJ rejected all 
of these arguments.25 By rejecting as legally significant that Nicaragua had technically 
not submitted its ratification properly, the ICJ also willingly passed on an exit opportu-
nity, clearly choosing to enter the political fray in a case where it knew that the Reagan 
administration would be deeply unhappy.  
Accepting jurisdiction in the case was risky. The US withdrawal from the ICJ’s 
compulsory jurisdiction was easy to reject—the US was bound to give six months ad-
vanced notification before withdrawing. But it was clear that any ICJ ruling would be 
ignored and contested.  Moreover, at the jurisdiction phase of the suit, El Salvador wan-
ted to submit a testament that it believed it was under attack, and wanted help from the 
US. The ICJ refused to consider the submission, arguing that such a submission was 
only relevant at the merits phase of the suit.26 The American judge on the ICJ, Judge 
Stephen Schwebel, loudly dissented both on the decision not to accept El Salvador’s 
                                                 
23  ICJ Order Of 10 May 1984 – Request For The Indication Of Provisional Measures. 
24 Nicaragua had wired confirmation of its ratification of the statute, but the formal document had somehow never 
arrived in Geneva.) 
25 ICJ Judgment Of 26 November 1984 - Jurisdiction Of The Court And Admissibility Of The Application 
26 ICJ Order Of 4 October 1984 – Declaration Of Intervention Of The Republic Of El Salvador. 
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statement and on the decision to accept jurisdiction in the case. While he was alone in 
his dissent, Schwebel’s long and passionately argued dissenting opinions provided the 
fodder American opponents used when they asserted the illegitimacy of the ICJ’s sub-
sequent decision and defended the legitimacy of the US’s subsequent behavior. 
The US responded to the ICJ’s jurisdictional ruling by notifying the UN that it was 
withdrawing from the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction (for all countries, not just Central 
American countries) and by refusing to participate in the merits phase of the procee-
dings.  This meant that El Salvador’s declaration of collective self-defense was never 
made, and that the US never defended itself—two more factors that critics seized on 
when they condemned the rest of the proceedings.   The Reagan Administration then 
ignored the proceedings, and the ICJ ruling. All of these behaviors were predictable and 
telecast in advance.  Still, the ICJ went on to roundly and completely condemn the US 
in its ruling on the merits—it did not sidestep key issues or offer much that the Reagan 
administration could feel vindicated by.27  
The question for this study is why the ICJ was not seemingly dissuaded by the cer-
tain US anger and non-compliance with its ruling. In fact none of the judges hearing the 
case were sanctioned and each member of the Nicaraguan defense (most of whom were 
American or European) went on to what those involved see as celebrated careers 
(Reichler 2001: 27). US conservatives still disdain the Nicaragua decision, but one finds 
the Nicaragua decision excerpted in nearly any casebook on international law, with no 
commentary questioning its legal validity. Not only have the legal principles of the ru-
lings not been reversed, but the core legal principles advanced in the decision—the right 
of the ICJ to evaluate the legality of the use of force, the illegality of supporting insur-
gent armed conflicts and of mining foreign harbors—appear to have been largely accep-
ted as legally valid even if they are still not uniformly respected (Gray 2000). 
While the ICJ was not reversed, there were real costs to this ruling in terms of exit 
and the legitimacy of the ICJ in the eyes of some Americans. Whereas before, the Rea-
gan administration had withdrawn from the ICJ’s jurisdiction in cases from Central 
America, now the United States withdrew completely from the ICJ’s compulsory juris-
diction—never again to return. A more lasting effect is that US conservative opposition 
to international adjudication deepened and hardened. The decision also made the US 
(and arguably other countries) more reluctant to use the ICJ. But as Richard Falk notes, 
they became more reluctant precisely because the ICJ was not under US control:  
the reason the United States did not want the case to go before the Court was in large 
measure because any self-respecting impartial lawyer could predict the outcome. I 
                                                 
27 ICJ Judgment Of 27 June 1986 - Military And Paramilitary Activities In And Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua V. 
United States Of America)- Merits 
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would argue that any kind of “impartially” selected tribunal of jurists, that was not cho-
sen from any of the contending countries or their close allies, would have come to the 
same decision as the World Court did. Anyone in the Legal Adviser’s Office would ha-
ve been able to anticipate that. Therefore impartiality is very intimidating.  The United 
States would have been much more likely to go to the World Court if it could have been 
confident of its partiality (Gordon et al. 1989: 517).    
The larger unanswerable question is whether the ICJ would be in a better place today if 
it had taken the cautious approach of finding it lacked jurisdiction, perhaps just for 
technical reasons like the failure of Nicaragua to formally submit its ratification docu-
ments. Many people saw the mining of the Nicaraguan harbors and the aiding of the 
Contras as clear violations of international law. These people would have seen the ICJ’s 
refusal to hear the case as evidence of the ICJ caving to US pressure—which may have 
been a greater stain on the ICJ’s reputation than a decision that was ignored by the Rea-
gan Administration and which angered American conservatives. Paul Reichler—the 
lawyer who recruited the legal team and organized Nicaragua’s legal strategy—sees the 
ICJ’s calculation this way: 
While the reaction in most quarters was hostile to the White House for its rejection of 
the Court, some U.S. academics criticized Nicaragua and its lawyers, especially [Nica-
ragua’s American lawyer Abe Chayes], for bringing a case that caused the U.S. wal-
kout. They argued that Nicaragua's suit undermined respect for the Court by demonstra-
ting its powerlessness--for surely a superpower like the United States would continue 
pursuing a foreign policy it considered vital to its national interests even if the Court 
ordered it to stop, and the Court had no means of enforcing its order…Does not all this 
weaken the Court and undermine its legitimacy--at least as to pronouncements invol-
ving peace and security? Is not the whole edifice of international adjudication, already 
fragile, put at risk? 
These are penetrating and difficult questions. Although the Court could not refer to 
them in its decision on jurisdiction, I have little doubt that they weighed as heavily on 
the judges. But in addressing these questions, we should not forget that the legitimacy 
of the Court and the prospects for the rule of law in international affairs are at stake 
whether the Court decides or refuses to decide the case before it.... And in the cir-
cumstances, it is only in The Hague that Nicaragua can face the United States on equal 
terms. It is the only forum where the outcome is not predetermined by the disparities of 
military and economic power between the parties. In the countries of the world that are 
possessed of neither the purse nor the sword, it would be a severe blow to the legitimacy 
and moral authority of the Court as well as to the claims for international law, if the 
door to that forum were closed. (Reichler 2001: 38) 
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Taking the Three Cases Together 
The three cases involve ICs taking on powerful countries, making rulings that states did 
not intend and would not have collectively made. The Kreil and Nicaragua rulings have 
neither led to sanctions against the judges nor a legislative reversal. We do not yet know 
the end of the story regarding the Safeguard Agreement, but there is good reason to be-
lieve that the AB will neither be sanctioned nor reversed because developing countries 
will fight tooth and nail against any reversion to the status quo ante of a weaker Safegu-
ard Agreement. One might have expected the ICJ to be the more politically influenced 
of three legal bodies because it is by design the least independent of the three ICs (the 
ICJ lacks compulsory jurisdiction, and has no enforcement mechanism for its rulings) 
(Helfer 2003: ; Posner and Yoo 2004), yet it too made an independent and bold ruling 
despite the certainty of a negative reaction by the Reagan administration. 
All three rulings changed the political context in which the specific issues were dis-
cussed. The WTO ruling and the ECJ ruling led to very different policies being adopted 
by the countries that lost the cases, and any Doha Round negotiations regarding the Sa-
feguard Agreement will take place with the understanding that current WTO law requi-
res states show that damages were “unforeseen.” The ICJ arguably shifted the domestic 
status quo of the Nicaragua policy ever so slightly. The lawyer who put together Nica-
ragua’s legal team identified the objective of the legal suit as shifting the few votes in 
the US Congress needed to defeat Contra-Aid. Fifteen days after the ICJ’s first ruling 
against US efforts to summarily dismiss the suit, Congress for the first time voted a-
gainst Contra-aid (Reichler, 2001: 34). The ruling also became another tool for use by 
actors opposing the Reagan Administration’s Nicaragua policy. These effects are mo-
dest to be sure-- the Reagan administration mostly ignored the ICJ and its policy implo-
ded for reasons unrelated to the ICJ decision.28  
One may contest that these are but three cases. True, but I would caution that signifi-
cant and empirically extensive multi-method efforts to study of P-A predictions with 
respect to the ECJ have not yielded better evidence for claims that sanctioning concerns 
or the power of the litigant states shape ECJ decision-making. The ECJ may be a so-
mewhat exceptional IC, but it is the only case where scholars have sought to test P-A 
predictions and the reasons P-A theory has not fared well has less to do with the distinc-
                                                 
28 When Sandinistas downed a contra airplane with a CIA Agent aboard, it became clear that the Reagan admini-
stration had violated the Senate’s Boland Amendment of 1982 prohibiting the federal government from providing 
military support "for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua.” The Iran-Contra scandal fol-
lowed, damaging the reputation for the entire Contra-aid policy. The ICJ had ordered the US to pay reparations to 
Nicaragua.  These were never paid, rather after the Arias Peace plan was initiated, and a new president of Nicara-
gua elected, the demand for reparations was dropped to pave the way for aid to the new government. 
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tiveness of the ECJ than it does with the methodological challenges of substantiating the 
expectations of P-A theory.29 
One may also contest that real issue is a concern about compliance, and compliance 
was not politically problematic for the Kreil case and the ICJ was in fact ignored. 
Compliance with IC decisions and international law could certainly bear improvement, 
which is likely true for federal rules and domestic supreme courts as well.30 But an IC 
that prioritized compliance over other objectives would likely end up sacrificing the 
goals of the agreement as well as its own legal legitimacy and political authority. 
Compliance is not the same thing as effectiveness, and as many have argued the real 
issue is the ability of the international agreements to induce states to change their beha-
vior to achieve the agreement’s objectives (Raustiala 2000). The real effectiveness test 
for ICs is not compliance with its rulings but the counterfactual of what would the out-
                                                 
29 Bernadette Kilroy set out to test the P-A expectation that the ECJ responded to sanctioning threats, coding ECJ 
decisions to see if they were biased in favor of the more powerful states (Kilroy 1999: , 1995). Kilroy herself 
found that the ECJ responded more to the threat of non-compliance than the threat that states might sanction the 
ECJ. Considering Kilroy’s analysis, Pollack finds that despite her efforts, Kilroy cannot rule out other explana-
tions of ECJ decision-making—such as the argument that the ECJ decides the case purely on the basis of law, 
without varying its rulings according to the power or intransigence of member states, or the likelihood of state 
compliance (Pollack 2003: 200).  Pollack’s own analysis of ECJ case law regarding gender equality came to a 
similar conclusion. When testing the claim that the ECJ retreated in its jurisprudence in response to the Barber 
Protocol, Pollack finds scant evidence… “Indeed one might argue that the Court’s post-Barber jurisprudence, 
rather than constituting a generalized retreat, represents a return to the pre-Barber pattern in which the Court gen-
erally, but not always, opts for a broad interpretation of Article 141, most often over the objections of one or 
more… member governments.” (p. 200).  
30 Compliance with IC rulings are actually quite high especially when one considers that it is often the hardest of 
cases that end up in front of an IC (the easier cases having settling out of court): 65 to 75% of ICJ decisions 
(Paulson 2004), 62% of GATT rulings (Busch and Reinhardt 2000: 471) and 88% of WTO rulings (up until 
2000) have led to full or partial compliance (Posner and Yoo 2004: 41). Compliance rates with European law vio-
lations pursued by the Commission and with decisions of the European Court of Human Rights appear to be even 
higher (Zorn and Van Winkle 2001: ; Borzel 2001).  Compliance rates with the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights are far less impressive (Posner and Yoo 2004: 41), but it is also true that the Inter-American court has very 
few cases—a fact which may be related to the low compliance levels. As Abraham and Antonia Chayes argue, 
the goal of full compliance is likely unrealistic in any political context (Chayes and Chayes 1993). In fact we do 
not actually know whether compliance rates for ICs are vastly worse than compliance rates for national supreme 
court decisions. The one study that has compared compliance across three levels (the national, the EU, and the 
WTO found that national compliance was no better, and in some respects worse, at the national compared to the 
supra-national and international levels (Zürn and Joerges 2005). 
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come have been absent the IC? Absent the WTO legal system the US would have conti-
nued its safeguards on lamb and steel, and likely continued to use its Section 301 tool 
(Reinhardt 2000).  Absent the ECJ, Germany would likely not yet have allowed women 
into so many roles in the military, and European countries would likely not have equali-
zed their pension schemes.  Absent the ICJ Belgium would not have cancelled its in-
dictment of the Congo’s foreign minister Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi and many boun-
dary disputes would still be on-going (Paulson 2004). This sample of findings likely 
understates the effectiveness of ICs because focusing only on a handful of key rulings 
overlooks many other rulings, and the many the cases settled in the shadow of a potenti-
al court ruling.31 
The larger question of this paper is whether a focus on the contract nature of delega-
tion helps us understand the relationship between ICs and states. My answer is that 
emphasizing that ICs rely on revocable delegated authority obscures more than it illu-
minates. This does not mean that ICs are unaccountable free agents; state recontracting 
is not the only tool of accountability (Keohane and Grant Forthcoming 2005). Conside-
ring the many rulings of ICs, slippage is actually a relatively rare phenomenon. This is 
because factors other than contracting concerns are at play. ICs are greatly constrained 
by the challenge of endeavoring compliance in a context where ICs have weak to no 
enforcement capabilities, and national governments have significant autonomy to decide 
whether or not they keep international covenants. Courts that seek to be progressive 
forces of change must also worry about inciting backlash by political leaders or do-
mestic populations. These factors, more than a fear of adverse recontracting, keep high-
ly independent IO Trustees accountable to popular sentiment and the sentiments of sta-
tes.  
V. CONCLUSIONS: MOVING BEYOND P-A ASSUMPTIONS 
This analysis argues what many people already accept—that courts are independent 
legal actors. Yet this analysis still keeps states as powerful actors. So one may ask why 
all the fuss, and where does the point of disagreement lie? Even though we know that 
courts are perhaps atypical “agents,” many people still find it hard to believe that inter-
national courts could act independently let alone exert any influence over powerful state 
                                                 
31 Authors who study how the shadow of the law affects bargaining have found that negotiation often reaches an 
outcome similar to what a court would have decided because both parties know the case can go to court should 
negotiations fail (Mnookin and Kornhauser 1979). For the international realm it seems that settlement in the 
shadow of the law is actually more likely before a case goes to court. Lawrence Busch and Eric Reinhardt find 
that cases settled before a GATT or WTO panel are established are far more likely to lead to plaintiff satisfaction 
(Busch and Reinhardt 2000), implying that the legal system has greater effects than one can observe by focusing 
only on cases litigated. 
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actors. This article explains IC independence and IC influence over states. The di-
sagreement with P-A theory is the special hierarchical power P-A theory expects states 
to have by virtue of their unique contracting power. This analysis suggests that being a 
member of the Principal confers relatively little power of its own in delegation to 
Trustees, and especially in the international context.  States remain powerful actors, but 
neither hierarchically above nor uniquely able to participate in the legitimacy politics 
created by and surrounding ICs.   
My questioning of P-A theory is aimed at three objectives. 
1) Blunting the ubiquitous rational expectations retort 
As a statement of methodology it may be true that “the fact that a court’s decisions are 
neither overturned nor the subject of considerable controversy does not demonstrate that 
[the court] exercises real discretion” because “a court that can take decisions that will 
provoke an adverse political reaction may prevent those reactions by avoiding such de-
cisions” (Garrett and Weingast 1993: 202). Yet just because ICs could be self-censoring 
to avoid adverse recontracting does not mean that ICs are likely self-censoring.  
There are numerous examples of IC decisions that go beyond what states intended 
when they wrote the law, that would never have been chosen by states themselves, that 
disappoint powerful actors, and that lead to political change that otherwise would not 
have occurred.  In a subset of these cases—like the Kreil case-- states are plausibly con-
tent to lose the case, and thereby have international judicial pressure to overcome do-
mestic political barriers to change. In other cases, it requires logic that only Jerry Sein-
feld could believe to explain away an example of ICJ activism—like the unforeseen 
damages cases. When theories are unfalsifiable, as are P-A theories and rational expec-
tations claims, the best one can do is say that there is good reason to shift the default 
assumption. This analysis provides many good reasons to shift from P-A theory’s de-
fault assumption that states as Principals are implicitly orchestrating IC behavior, and  
thus to subject rational expectations arguments to far stricter scrutiny. 
First, as Section II argued the Trustee nature of ICs creates the ability for ICs to act 
autonomously. A Trustee’s reputational authority helps it weather adverse Principal 
reactions, and even provides the Trustee with an incentive not to bend to Principal pre-
ferences. Second, for delegation to ICs in specific, Principal control tools actually seem 
to be quite difficult to wield.  ICs are hard to stack; IC judges are unlikely to be perso-
nally sanctioned for their rulings; IC decisions are almost never reversed; and IC man-
dates are pretty much never scaled back.  In fact ICs should rationally anticipate no ad-
verse recontracting even if they disappoint powerful countries like the US, or the vast 
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majority of countries as the WTO’s Appellate Body did when it allowed amicus brief 
submissions.32  
States obviously have decisive influence in writing the law. We should expect the 
law to reflect the interests of the most powerful states (Steinberg 2002), and for ICs to 
enforce the law, thus we should expect a naturally high congruence between IC decisi-
ons enforcing the law and the intentions of the Principal. While we need not reflexively 
reject that states are influencing IC decision-making, as a matter of empirical inference 
we should assume that evidence of state unhappiness with legal rulings is sincere and 
meaningful, that IC decisions that seem to depart from the clear or previously accepted 
understandings of the law are likely reflecting IC independence As Terry Moe once 
said: "A new public agency is literally a new actor on the political scene. It has its own 
interests, which may diverge from those of its creators, and it typically has resources—
expertise, delegated authority—to strike out on its own should the opportunities arise.  
The political game is different now: there are more players and more interests to be ac-
commodated.”(Moe 1990: 121) ICs are key actors changing the international political 
game.  We should focus on understanding how the international political game has 
changed, rather than the ways in which it is potentially still controlled by states. 
2) Provoking P-A theorists to circumscribe the realm in which P-A theo-
ry is analytically useful, and thereby improve their theory 
This argument is not per se outside of the P-A framework—nothing involving delegati-
on is. When Principals delegate, they always have rational “reasons” for doing so.  
Furthermore, any “Agent” can be located somewhere on the continuum of constrained 
to autonomous actors. The question is whether P-A theory provides novel analytical 
leverage to understand the ongoing Principal-Agent relationship? That extreme behavior 
can be addressed through the contract does not mean that normal behavior is controlled 
through the contract—and court law-making as well as rulings that upset the powerful 
are par for the course in judicial politics. Nor is it per se true or helpful to say that A-
gents at some level always worry about recontracting, that more autonomous Agents 
slip more, or that decision rule X leads to relatively greater autonomy than decision rule 
Y. While P-A theory could be broadened to bring in enough factors to explain IC beha-
vior, or we could map State-IO relations as multiple principal relationships even though 
it takes collective behavior to change the contract. But we should question how far we 
want to go to save P-A theory. In my view, the power of P-A theory comes form its par-
simonious focus on the contracting nature of the P-A relationship. Circumscribing the 
                                                 
32 United States--Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R DSR (Dispute Set-
tlement Reports) 1998:VII 2755 (Oct. 12, 1998 adopted, Dispute Settlement Body, Nov. 6, 1998) pps. 53-54 & 
76. 
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universe in which we expect P-A theory to provide useful analytical leverage in asses-
sing a relationship (in this case the relationship between states and IOs) would, in my 
view, be a good way to strengthen not weaken P-A theory.    
P-A Theorists should consider whether there are inherently different types of delega-
tion. Expectations matter. We would expect P-A tools to work well in the context of 
political appointees because those involved know that the point of the political appoint-
ment process is to keep administrative leaders in touch with the desires of political bo-
dies. Delegation to Trustees is an inherently different situation, in large part because 
those involved intend and expect Trustees to behave differently than traditional Agents. 
We should expect the insights about the differences between traditional Agents and 
Trustees to hold even if the information context across institutions does or does not va-
ry, and recontracting decision-rules do or do not vary.  And this insight should even 
hold in delegation to traditional Agents where Agents develop expertise and a reputation 
that is popular among the receivers of Agent decision-making, widening the circle of 
those with expectations about what should and should not happen (Carpenter 2001).  
International relations scholars should question the applicability of P-A theory to the 
international realm. Even if you reject that expectations matter, it is still clear that P-A 
tools are likely to be much harder to use in the international compared to the domestic 
realm because the international “Principal” must act collectively to sanction or control 
an Agent, meanwhile states’ penchant for protecting national sovereignty leads to deci-
sion-making rules that are often antithetical collective decision-making at the internati-
onal level. P-A theory also translates less well to the international context because states 
are not like a junior congressman whose sole source of authority comes from his mem-
bership in the collective Principal. States—both strong and weak-- have varied sources 
of power that are above and beyond what an ordinary member of the domestic collective 
Principal often has, translating into tools of leverage that have nothing to do with re-
contracting power and that may not even be discernable by examining traditional sour-
ces of actor power (wealth, voting system, coalition politics, military might etc). These 
points are obvious, yet for those looking to generalize P-A theory to the international 
realm, these essential differences are easily overlooked.  
P-A analyses should pit P-A expectations against alternative explanations: Ultimate-
ly the only way to tell if P-A theory is providing insight is to pit P-A expectations a-
gainst alternative explanations.  Only by comparing alternative explanations can we tell 
if IOs behavior is primarily shaped by states preferences or something else entirely.  
Studies on P-A theory should actively seek to ascertain where and when state preferen-
ces matter more than other contextual factors or other non-state political factors in in-
fluencing specific IO behaviors. Scholars who do continue to use P-A analysis to study 
IOs should be especially careful to consider whether the cooperation context or nature 
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of the cooperative game (coordination games, cooperation games, prisoner’s dilemma, 
chicken etc)(Oye 1986) is the primary factor shaping IO behavior rather than variation 
in state preferences or control tools.  
3) Switching the Questions we are Asking 
The promise of delegation to ICs is that ICs will create a legal and political space where 
regular politics and the power disparities in the world do not shape outcomes. If delega-
tion to ICs succeeds, it will bring a loss of state control that practitioners and political 
scientists may find uncomfortable. If delegation to ICs is effective in its objectives state 
power will be undermined, non-state actors will be able to use the law written by states 
as a political tool of influence, states will at times be thwarted from pursuing their most 
preferred policy, and international relations will be transformed.   
This promise (or perhaps nightmare depending on one’s perspective) is often not rea-
lized.  The reason the promise is not achieved, however, may have less to do with states 
controlling IC decision-making than with pre- and post-ruling politics that are aimed at 
keeping cases from ICs, or blunting the impact of unwanted IC rulings.  Precisely be-
cause states cannot control IC decision-making they have had to employ a series of tac-
tics to avoid unwanted IC rulings. These tactics are observed by legal scholars, but are 
yet to be investigated systematically by political scientists—yet they are central to state-
IC politics and to understanding how international legalization is influencing internatio-
nal politics (Goldstein et al. 2001).  
In terms of pre-ruling politics, political scientists should ask: what are the sources of 
variation in which cases make it to court? How do legal caveats and reservations shape 
IC decision-making?  How is collusion or extra-legal pressure used to keep cases from 
court? How often do states shift disputes to less legalized forums that are more control-
lable, and how does the ability to orchestrate this shift shape the politics of international 
law and international relations? How does the creation of compulsory jurisdiction, and 
with it the loss of state ability to keep cases from court, change an IC’s docket, decision-
making, and influence in international relations?  How does the ability of private liti-
gants to raise cases in ICs undermine the ability of states to keep cases out of court, and 
are ICs with private litigant access in fact more independent, and more activist than ICs 
without private litigant access?33 In terms of post-ruling politics, scholars should ask: 
How do states respond to IC rulings that shift the previously understood meaning of 
international law? How is the legitimacy of international law changed when state con-
sent is no longer the sole basis for international law? How does the ability of ICs to is-
                                                 
33 For arguments on this question see:  (Keohane, Moravcsik, and Slaughter 2000: ; Helfer and Slaughter 1997: ; 
Posner and Yoo 2004) 
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sue independent authoritative interpretations of the law empower non-state actors and 
weaken state power?   
These questions only make sense once we embrace the idea that states are not hierar-
chically in charge of ICs, and are influenced by independent interpretations of ICs.  
To reject P-A analysis is in no way to say that politics does not matter in internatio-
nal judicial decision-making.  Merely by enforcing the law ICs serve as the handmaiden 
of the political interests behind international law. States influence and often control 
which questions are raised in court. And political factors surely shape which actors tend 
to win in court, which cases are settled out of court, how judges exercise their judicial 
discretion, and what happens to legal rulings after they are issued.  To question the utili-
ty of P-A theory is simply to say that a different sort of politics is at play, a politics 
where states’ monopoly power to recontract matters little, where internationally negotia-
ted compromises can be unseated through legal interpretation, where states can come to 
find themselves constrained by principles they never agreed to, and where non-state 
actors have influence and can effectively use international law against states. Once sta-
tes agree that the meaning of international law can be determined by IC interpretations, 
they are no longer the “masters of the treaty” or of international politics.  Political scien-
tists should we investigate how international politics is in fact transformed as a result. 
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